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PAST & PURPOSENEWS · HISTORY · AUDIO
1901195319792026IRAN

PAST & PURPOSE · EMPIRE, REVOLUTION & WAR

Iran’s Crisis Is More Than a Century Old

Before uranium, there was oil. Before the Islamic Republic, there was a struggle over who controlled Iran.

The confrontation grew through foreign intervention, authoritarian rule, revolution, invasion, sanctions, and failed diplomacy. Each chapter left a different wound.

Updated 11 October 202624 min read1901—2026

Iran’s crisis is often introduced with centrifuges, missiles, and threats.

But starting there is like opening a book in its final chapters.

Long before the nuclear dispute, Iran faced another question: could a country control its own resources when powerful outsiders depended on them?

Long before the revolution of 1979, Iranians faced a second question: could they limit the power of their own rulers?

Those struggles—against foreign interference and domestic authoritarianism—sometimes reinforced each other. Sometimes one was used to suppress the other.

Together, they provide a thread through more than a century of Iranian history.

This is not one continuous war. It is a succession of crises whose consequences accumulated.

01

1901–1911 · OIL & CONSTITUTION

Oil abroad, constitutional power at home

In 1901, a concession granted to William Knox D’Arcy opened the way for foreign exploitation of Iranian oil. Commercial oil was discovered in 1908, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company followed in 1909.

The concession’s history became the foundation of a business that eventually developed into BP.

Meanwhile, Iranians were fighting over how their country should be governed.

The Constitutional Revolution produced a parliament in 1906 and challenged arbitrary royal authority. Its supporters included people with different political, religious, and economic interests. Their coalition was neither uniform nor permanently united.

Royal resistance, internal divisions, and pressure from foreign powers undermined the constitutional experiment.

This matters because Iran’s political history did not begin with a choice between a shah and an ayatollah. There was an earlier struggle for constitutional government.

The demand for Iranian independence included independence from unchecked power at home.

02

1921–1941 · THE PAHLAVI STATE

Building a stronger state—and a stronger ruler

Reza Khan rose to prominence through the coup of 1921 and became shah in 1925.

His government expanded central administration, education, and state authority. It curtailed competing centres of power and sought to make Iran more cohesive and capable.

But strengthening the country also strengthened the monarchy.

That is a recurring dilemma in this history: national modernisation could advance while political participation contracted.

In 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union occupied Iran. Reza Shah abdicated, and his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, succeeded him.

The occupation offered a harsh demonstration of Iran’s vulnerability. Its position mattered to larger powers, and neutrality could not guarantee protection.

03

1946 · THE EARLY COLD WAR

The forgotten crisis with Moscow

After the Second World War, Soviet troops remained in Iran beyond the agreed withdrawal deadline.

Iran protested. American diplomatic records describe the Soviet presence as continuing without Iranian consent, and the dispute became an early confrontation of the emerging Cold War. Soviet forces eventually withdrew.

This episode complicates the familiar “Iran versus the West” narrative.

Iranian suspicion of outside powers was not exclusively directed at Britain or America. Moscow also threatened Iranian sovereignty.

Later cooperation between Tehran and Moscow should not erase that history.

Foreign policy relationships change. Historical fears can survive the change.

04

1951–1953 · OIL, COUP & GOVERNMENT

The oil dispute that became a struggle over government

In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh’s government nationalised the British-controlled oil industry.

For Iranian nationalists, the dispute concerned revenues, sovereignty, and the right to change a concession they considered unjust.

For Britain, it threatened a major commercial and strategic interest. The oil confrontation became entangled with domestic Iranian rivalries and American fears about communist influence.

In August 1953, British and American covert intervention helped overthrow Mosaddegh. Iranian military officers, royalists, and other domestic actors were essential to the outcome.

Reducing the coup to an entirely foreign operation erases Iranian participants. Reducing it to a purely domestic uprising erases foreign intervention. Both mattered.

An American policy document subsequently identified protecting the wider international oil-business framework and avoiding an adverse precedent for foreign investment among the objectives of settling the dispute.

Iran was challenging an arrangement whose consequences extended beyond Iran.

A dispute over who owned the oil became a dispute over who could govern the country.

05

1953–1978 · THE SHAH

America’s ally—and a monarchy losing consent

The shah became a close American partner.

His government pursued extensive modernisation, including land reform, education programmes, and changes affecting women’s rights. It also developed a powerful security apparatus and restricted political opposition.

Modernisation and repression existed together.

Supporters could point to development. Opponents could point to coercion, inequality, and the concentration of power.

This distinction prevents two misleading portraits: an idyllic monarchy destroyed without cause, or a society in which nothing improved before the revolution.

A government can transform a country materially while losing the consent of people it governs.

06

1979–1981 · REVOLUTION & RUPTURE

A revolution, then a diplomatic rupture

The movement that toppled the shah contained competing visions of Iran’s future.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his allies ultimately consolidated an Islamic Republic with clerical authority at its centre. The fall of the monarchy did not produce the political freedom all its opponents had imagined.

In November 1979, militants seized the American embassy in Tehran. Fifty-two Americans were held for 444 days. The crisis helped destroy diplomatic relations and made Iran a lasting symbol of humiliation and danger in American politics.

The two countries now carried different formative memories.

For many Iranians, 1953 represented foreign interference. For many Americans, 1979 represented hostage-taking and revolutionary hostility.

Each side could recall an event proving that the other could not be trusted.

Understanding those memories explains distrust. It does not justify taking hostages or overthrowing governments.

07

1980–1988 · INVASION

The invasion that reshaped Iranian security

In September 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Iran, beginning eight years of war.

Cities, shipping, and civilian life became targets. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces and civilians. The damage continued long after the fighting ended.

Iran was initially defending itself against invasion. After recovering territory, its leadership continued the war into Iraq rather than accepting an early end.

That distinction matters: being attacked did not remove Iranian leaders’ responsibility for subsequent decisions.

The conflict helps explain the later importance of missiles, military self-reliance, and armed partners to Iran’s security establishment.

That is a historical interpretation, not an endorsement. Measures intended to make Iran harder to attack could also threaten other countries and fuel further confrontation.

During the Iran–Contra affair, American officials secretly arranged arms dealings with Iran while publicly confronting its government. Even entrenched enemies sometimes negotiated when immediate interests aligned.

08

THE GULF · SHIPPING & ENERGY

How a bilateral dispute became everyone’s problem

The Iran–Iraq War spread into attacks on commercial shipping.

The United States became directly involved in protecting Gulf traffic, bringing American and Iranian forces into confrontation. The conflict demonstrated how a regional war could endanger international trade.

Geography gave Iran influence beyond its economic size.

The Strait of Hormuz became central to calculations about pressure, retaliation, and the movement of energy supplies.

That remains one reason the Iran crisis reaches people who have little direct connection to Iran: disruption can travel through shipping costs and energy markets.

09

THE REGION · ARMED PARTNERS

Deterrence through armed partners

Iran helped nurture Hezbollah during Lebanon’s civil war and after Israel’s 1982 invasion, sending Revolutionary Guard personnel to train and advise emerging forces.

Over subsequent decades, Tehran developed relationships with armed organisations across the region.

Those relationships differed. The groups had local constituencies, political ambitions, and varying degrees of dependence on Iran. They were not interchangeable units operating under a single remote control.

Iran’s network nevertheless extended its influence and created threats to Israel, Gulf governments, and American interests.

Here lies a security dilemma: what Tehran presents as protection or resistance can appear to neighbouring states as encirclement or aggression. Both the perceptions and the actual violence matter.

10

2004–2026 · YEMEN & THE HOUTHIS

A local war becomes a regional pressure point

The Houthi movement emerged from northern Yemen and fought successive wars with the central government beginning in 2004. Its roots were local: political exclusion, religious identity, state weakness, and the balance of power inside Yemen.

The movement seized Sanaa in 2014. Saudi Arabia led a military intervention in 2015 in support of Yemen’s internationally recognised government, turning the conflict into a regional war with severe consequences for civilians.

Iranian support later expanded the Houthis’ missile, drone, and maritime capabilities. But the movement retains its own leadership and local ambitions; describing every Houthi decision as a direct Iranian order hides as much as it explains.

A UN-brokered truce in 2022 reduced cross-border attacks without producing a comprehensive political settlement. The unresolved war left both the military infrastructure and the grievances that could restart it.

The attacks on Riyadh in October 2026 show how that local conflict now intersects with the wider Iran war. Airports, oil facilities, and the Bab el-Mandeb shipping route can all become pressure points far beyond Yemen.

11

1967–2015 · NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY

An older programme, a newer confrontation

Iran’s nuclear programme began before the Islamic Republic.

The Tehran research reactor entered operation in 1967, and Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty framework under the shah.

The later dispute concerned undeclared activities, verification, enrichment, and whether civilian capabilities concealed weapons-related work.

The IAEA’s 2015 assessment found coordinated activities relevant to developing a nuclear explosive device before the end of 2003, with some activity afterward. It assessed that this work had not advanced beyond feasibility studies, scientific research, and certain technical capabilities.

Precision matters.

Enrichment capacity, weapons-related research, possession of weapons-grade material, and possession of a functioning nuclear weapon are different claims.

12

2015–2020 · THE AGREEMENT

An agreement—and its unravelling

The 2015 nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, exchanged nuclear restrictions and enhanced verification for sanctions relief.

In 2018, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States and restored sanctions. Iran subsequently exceeded the agreement’s limits.

In January 2020, an American strike killed Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. Iran retaliated against bases housing American troops in Iraq.

The agreement’s collapse left a question that technical negotiations could not easily answer: would concessions survive a change of government on the other side?

An agreement can be measurable and still politically fragile.

13

2022 · WOMAN, LIFE, FREEDOM

Iran’s internal crisis cannot be reduced to foreign policy

In 2022, the death of Jina Mahsa Amini after detention by Iran’s morality police sparked widespread protests.

Women’s freedom, compulsory dress rules, state violence, and political accountability became central demands. UN human-rights officials documented concerns about the violent repression of demonstrators.

This is another reason “Iran versus America” is too narrow.

Iranian citizens have their own disputes with their government. Their demands cannot simply be treated as instruments of outside powers.

A state can face foreign threats while violating the rights of its population. Both realities belong in the history.

14

2024–2026 · THE LIVE CHAPTER

From shadow conflict to direct war

In April 2024, Iran launched its first direct attack on Israel following a suspected Israeli strike on its diplomatic compound in Damascus.

Decades of covert confrontation were becoming open exchanges.

Israel attacked Iranian nuclear and military targets in June 2025. The United States subsequently struck major nuclear facilities.

On 28 February 2026, a new joint American–Israeli campaign began. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed, and Iran retaliated against Israel and American facilities in the Gulf.

The crisis now involved leadership, missiles, nuclear infrastructure, regional military positions, and international shipping simultaneously.

Houthi-claimed attacks struck King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh on 8 October. Saudi authorities said three Saudi nationals were killed, several people were injured, and a Saudia aircraft was damaged.

A further missile attack hit the airport on 10 October. Saudi authorities said 12 people were killed and more than 300 wounded. On 11 October, the airport remained closed and Riyadh schools moved online. The UN Secretary-General attributed the attack to the Houthis, condemned it, and said attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure must cease.

The Houthis did not immediately claim the 10 October attack, but threatened further strikes. Saudi-led forces continued operations in Yemen; a Houthi-run ministry reported a child killed in a suspected Saudi strike in Sanaa. The competing claims require independent verification, but the direction of escalation is clear.

The widening conflict is reaching the global economy. Reuters reported that the Iran war and disruption to energy supplies would dominate the IMF and World Bank meetings opening in Bangkok, with accessible oil storage running down and debt pressures rising.

The latest chapter remains unsettled.

Latest reporting: Associated Press · United Nations · Reuters

WHAT THE CENTURY REVEALS

Five histories. One unresolved question.

01

Sovereignty

Oil concessions, occupation, and the 1953 coup.

02

Government

Constitutionalism, monarchy, revolution, and repression.

03

Security

Invasion, missiles, regional partners, and deterrence.

04

Nuclear power

Civilian technology, weapons concerns, and verification.

05

Diplomacy

Sanctions, agreements, withdrawals, and failures of trust.

They overlap without being identical.

The Islamic Republic did not invent every Iranian grievance. Historical grievances do not excuse its repression or attacks.

Foreign intervention helped shape the crisis. Iranian leaders also made consequential choices. And the population has repeatedly paid for decisions made in its name.

Can Iran secure independence abroad and accountable government at home—without another generation being asked to sacrifice one for the other?